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However, to the outside world, the CEO selection process might be characterized as a "black box." Shareholders and the public alike do not know when a succession event might occur, who the leading candidates are, whether the corporation has adopted a rigorous process to develop and evaluate them, and whether the most qualified person was ultimately selected. While the research literature does not shine a clear light on these issues, the available evidence is not particularly encouraging. One survey of corporate directors finds that most admit to not having detailed knowledge of the skills, capabilities, and performance of senior executives just one level below the CEO. Only half (55 percent) of respondents claim to understand these skills either well or very well. Most directors (77 percent) do not participate in the performance evaluation of executives one level below the CEO, and only in rare circumstances (7 percent) do board members formally serve as mentors to them.
2 Furthermore, research shows that inadequate talent development and succession planning negatively impact future corporate performance. For example, , Dawley, Riley, and Yang (2006) find that the longer it takes a company to name a successor, the worse it subsequently performs relative to peers.
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To ensure the long-term success of a corporation, shareholders therefore want assurance that the board has a sound process in place to evaluate, develop, and identify the most promising talent.
However, without an inside look at the leading candidates to assume the CEO role, how can shareholders tell whether boards are making correct choices?
SucceSSion candidateS
One approach to evaluating the quality of a company's selection process is to consider the executives who were passed over for the Mutual companies were excluded from the sample because they lack publicly traded stock price information.
Among the 77 companies with a succession event, we collected two sets of information. Performance. Finally, we studied the stock price performance of the succession "winners" against that of the executives who became the CEO of another publicly traded firm after being passed over. 7 We identified 17 such individuals. On average, the succession winners saw 3-year, cumulative stock price returns that were approximately equal to the S&P 500: These companies returned 8 percent cumulatively, on average-2 percentage points below the index level. By contrast, the executives who became CEO at another company oversaw a 3-year, cumulative loss of 13 percent, on average, compared to a 10 percent gain in the S&P
500-a 22 percentage point differential (see Exhibit 2).
Although it is tempting to conclude that succession "losers"
are associated with poor subsequent performance (perhaps justifying the fact that they were not selected as CEO by their original company), one extremely important caveat is in order.
The research literature routinely shows that companies that hire external CEOs tend to perform worse than those who promote internal executives. One reason for this result is that companies that recruit external CEOs tend to be in worse financial condition than those that promote an internal executive. The very fact that they go to the external market to hire a CEO suggests that no internal candidates are viable or that the company requires wholesale changes that an internal candidate is less likely to be able to achieve. All succession losers who join another firm as CEO are, by definition, external hires and fall under this qualification.
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In our sample, the companies that hired succession losers also exhibited negative relative stock-price performance for the six months prior to hiring them.
Nevertheless, in aggregate, our data modestly suggests that corporate boards do a reasonable job of identifying CEO talent. Furthermore, candidates who are recruited to new firms after being passed over appear to perform worse (relative to benchmarks) than those who were selected at the original company. While it is important not to overweigh these results because of the qualifications mentioned above, the magnitude of the difference between their performance suggests that board members might be more adept at evaluating CEO-level talent than the broad research literature indicates.
Why thiS MatterS
1. CEO succession events among major corporations garner considerable external scrutiny from shareholders and the media. Are the executives ultimately selected for the role really "better" than those passed over? What information can shareholders use to assess the decisions made by the board? What types of disclosures might a firm release to help shareholders feel comfortable with the succession process?
2. The data suggests that only a small number of executives who are passed over as CEO become CEO at another company. 
What implications does this have on understanding the breadth
